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Relativism Part II: The Scope of Relativism
John Dickson
Relativism is 'the theory of knowledge or ethics which holds that
criteria of judgment are relative, varying with the individual, time,
and circumstance.' It is as old as the 5th-century BC philosopher
Protagoras and has impacted the range of human experience—morality,
culture, religion, philosophy, science and the very notion of existence
itself (see the article, 'The Origins of Relativism'). Once the wave of
relativism got moving it swamped all before it: the catchphrase
‘Everything is relative’ is overused to the point of cliché today. And
while few of us really believe that everything is relative, there are
at least three spheres of life that have come to be viewed
relativistically: culture, morals and, of course, religion.
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Once the wave of relativism got moving it swamped all before it.
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Cultural relativism
Cultural relativism is the view that no one culture is better or worse than another—just as the early anthropologists argued. The habits of one culture are true/valid only within that culture and are not necessarily true/valid for another culture. In Part I, I mentioned the example of female circumcision, but plenty of others exist. In Australia recently the Egyptian Muslim cleric Sheikh Taj Din al Hilali was quoted comparing unveiled women to ‘uncovered meat’ inviting the attacks of prowling cats (i.e., men). The uproar in the media was fascinating. While apologising for the offence to non-Muslim Australians, Sheik Halali defended his comments on the grounds that they were intended for a Muslim audience. For Muslims, he believed, his teachings were culturally appropriate (many Muslims publicly disagreed with him). Not good enough, declared Sophie Mirabella MP, who took the opportunity in Parliament to call for an end to such ‘cultural relativism’:
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I rise this evening to speak on an issue very close to my heart, and
that is the need to stand up for who we are as a nation and the need to
say no to men who use any excuse for rape—the need to say no to Sheikh
al-Hilali … [W]e certainly have not misunderstood him calling all of us
women ‘meat’ just because we do not grab a huge sheet and wrap
ourselves as if we should be ashamed of the bodies that God gave us. We
are not going to stand by and let this man get away with it. There
needs to be an end to cultural relativism … There are basic laws that
apply to all Australians and one Australian legal system should apply
to every single Australian whether they be atheist, Christian or
Muslim. On behalf of not just the women in my electorate but all
Australian women I reject these comments that he has made.
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Strong stuff; and the discussion continues.
Moral Relativism
Moral relativism, of course, is the same logic applied to the question
of right and wrong. For one person abortion is immoral; for another it
is perfectly legitimate. No one is right or wrong. Such views can only
be evaluated relative to the framework of the person holding such
views. While the moral relativism argument sounds compelling, it has
always troubled philosophers, even the relativistic ones. Murder may
seem morally acceptable to a serial killer but not to society at
large—and not, I should add, to most relativists either.
So how do we
work out which framework to use when determining right and wrong? Most
relativists have answered: society’s framework. There is no right or
wrong in an absolute sense, say relativists, but societies can debate
and legislate on what they consider appropriate for the group. Once
this social contract is determined—through habits, customs and
laws—people are obliged to live according to the agreed upon moral
code. So, murder is not immoral in the absolute sense; but it is
‘wrong’ within societies which decide it is wrong.
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While the moral relativism argument sounds compelling, it has always troubled philosophers, even relativistic ones.
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A fascinating example of a thoroughgoing relativist is Lord Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), probably the greatest atheistic mind of the 20th century. In 1948 Russell was invited to debate, live on BBC radio, the renowned Roman Catholic philosopher, Frederick Copleston (1907-1994). At one point, Copleston pressed Russell to explain what he thought was the basis of distinguishing right from wrong. Russell admitted that, for him, it is just like choosing one colour from another (‘C’ is Copleston; ‘R’ is Russell):
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C: Yes, but what's your justification for distinguishing between good and bad or how do you view the distinction between them?
R: I don't have any justification any more than I have when I
distinguish between blue and yellow. What is my justification for
distinguishing between blue and yellow? I can see they are different.
C: Well, that is an excellent justification, I agree. You distinguish
blue and yellow by seeing them, so you distinguish good and bad by what
faculty?
R: By my feelings.
C: By your feelings. Well, that's what I was asking. You think that good and evil have reference simply to feeling?
R: Well, why does one type of object look yellow and another look blue?
I can more or less give an answer to that thanks to the physicists, and
as to why I think one sort of thing good and another evil, probably
there is an answer of the same sort, but it hasn't been gone into in
the same way and I couldn't give it [to] you.
C: Well, let's take the behaviour of the Commandant of Belsen. That
appears to you as undesirable and evil and to me too. To Adolf Hitler
we suppose it appeared as something good and desirable, I suppose you'd
have to admit that for Hitler it was good and for you it is evil.
R: No, I shouldn't quite go so far as that. I mean, I think people can
make mistakes in that as they can in other things. If you have jaundice
you see things yellow that are not yellow. You're making a mistake.
C: Yes, one can make mistakes, but can you make a mistake if it's
simply a question of reference to a feeling or emotion? Surely Hitler
would be the only possible judge of what appealed to his emotions.
R: It would be quite right to say that it appealed to his emotions, but
you can say various things about that among others, that if that sort
of thing makes that sort of appeal to Hitler's emotions, then Hitler
makes quite a different appeal to my emotions.
C: Granted. But there's no objective criterion outside feeling then for
condemning the conduct of the Commandant of Belsen, in your view?
R: No more than there is for the color-blind person who's in exactly
the same state. Why do we intellectually condemn the color-blind man?
Isn't it because he's in the minority?
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For the relativist, what is right and wrong comes down to the feeling of the majority. That is all there is. The Christian worldview, by contrast, insists that the world was created by God and so reality is shaped by his own character (of justice, love, and so on). Ethics, then, are not a matter of feeling or democracy; they derive objectively from the One who stands at the centre of the universe.
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